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Summary
This paper analyzes the use of journey metaphors by three early Greek philosophers, Hera-
clitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles. My investigation emphasizes the powerful, malleable
and polyvalent nature of this metaphor cluster both with reference to diverse authors and
in the same text. It highlights, moreover, the relationship between metaphor, imagination
and philosophical argumentation, above all when a fresh metaphorical stratum is intro-
duced within an already established metaphor. Finally, it investigates to what extent the
introduction of a fresh metaphorical stratum contributes to creative thinking and, by struc-
turing and organizing new insights, to theoretical argumentation.
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Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Verwendung von Reise-Metaphern von drei frühgriechischen
Denkern: Heraklit, Parmenides und Empedokles. Meine Untersuchung hebt die ausdruck-
starke, leichtplastische und polyvalente Natur dieses Metaphern-Bereiches sowohl in Bezug
auf diversen Autoren, als auch in ein und demselben Text hervor. Im Fokus steht der Zusam-
menhang zwischen Metapher, Imagination und philosophischer Argumentation, beson-
ders wenn ein neuer metaphorischer Stratus in einen schon etablierten Metapher-Bereich
eingeführt wird. Schließlich wird auch untersucht, in wie fern ein neuer metaphorischer
Stratus, indem dieser neue Kenntnisse und Einsichten strukturiert und organisiert, zum
kreativen Denken und zur theoretischen Argumentation beiträgt.
Keywords: Heraklit; Parmenides; Empedokles; Metapher; Reise; Weg; theoretische Argu-
mentation
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By paraphrasing the outset of a book by Z. Kövecses,1 consider the use in English of
the following phrases: following a story or feeling lost when not following it; going over a
talk; reaching a good point; going around in circles when arguing ineffectually; coming to
a conclusion; following a path of thoughts; and so on. These phrases would not count
in English as using particularly poetic or picturesque language. Yet the expressions in
italics are all metaphors related to the domain of journey. We can see that a large part
of the way we speak about aspects of knowledge in English derives from the way we
speak about journeys. In fact, it seems that speakers of English make extensive use of the
concrete and familiar domain of journey when they talk about the highly abstract and
elusive concept of knowledge.
Ancient Greek authors analogously spoke about aspects of knowledge by employ-
ing journey metaphors. In fact, a traditional, ancient image depicts poetry as a chariot
and the poet as a traveler who, following the paths of songs, composes. More gener-
ally, ancient Greek terminology depicts the act of composing a song or of storytelling
in terms of following paths, the results of this composing in terms of destinations, and
the poets or authors who are composing in terms of travelers who, during this journey,
acquire and at the same time give form to their knowledge.2
In this paper, I analyze the use of journey metaphors by three early Greek philoso-
phers, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles, thereby attempting to indicate the pur-
poses behind their metaphor use. One main question that my analysis aims to raise con-
cerns the powerful, malleable, and polyvalent nature of a metaphor cluster both with ref-
erence to diverse authors and in the same text. Another question concerns the relation-
ship between metaphor, imagination, and philosophical argumentation, above all when
a fresh metaphorical stratum is introduced within an already established metaphor.
More speciﬁcally, to what extent does a fresh metaphorical stratum contribute to origi-
nal and creative developments in theoretical argumentation?
I will show to what extent, despite drawing from the same metaphor cluster, Her-
aclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles make use of the conceptual domain of journey
1 Kövecses 2002, 3.
2 See Ferella 2017, 112–114 and the contribution
of Hose in this volume. Becker 1937, 100–116,
by analysing the development of the traditional
motive of ways of songs or ways of stories in Pin-
dar, Herodotus, and the tragic poets Aeschylus
and Sophocles, already concluded that journey
metaphors developed from spoken language and
became, in Homer, a conventionalized way of refer-
ring to poetical composition, storytelling, or, more
simply, to talking/writing about something in gen-
eral. Journey metaphors depicting diverse aspects of
knowledge (which either have to be acquired or,
once acquired, must be expressed in words) are
especially conventional in prose, for instance in
Herodotus (where we frequently ﬁnd expressions
such as ἒρχομαι φράσων, λέξων, ἐρέων; ἤια λέξων
or ἄνειμι, ἀναβαίνω, ἐπάνειμι, ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον λό-
γον, etc.
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in very different ways. However, in all cases, the evaluation of metaphor use is closely
dependent upon the context in which journey metaphors are employed. This may raise
problems with reference to fragmentary traditions, in which quotations of authors’ own
words are often given without context. In the present study, this particularly affects our
interpretation of Heraclitus’ metaphors, which will be analyzed and evaluated by taking
into account all possible contextual scenarios. As a consequence, Heraclitus’ use of jour-
ney metaphors may be either entrenched or highly lively and intentional, depending
on which context we account for. On the other hand, both Parmenides’ and Empedo-
cles’ use of journey metaphors can be considered as unconventional and deliberate; yet
they show diverse communicative purposes. Speciﬁcally, Parmenides’ metaphor use has
a strongly paraenetic scope: he uses journey metaphors to dramatize the choice towards
his philosophy, depicted as the only path that leads to ‘rescuing’ truth, in contrast to
the path of ‘ordinary’ people who, because they know nothing, are merely wandering
around. Empedocles, on the other hand, not only uses traditional journey metaphors,
but also introduces a fresh metaphorical stratum within the established metaphor cluster
for argumentative and theoretical purposes: journey metaphors structure and organize
his theory of sensation and knowledge acquisition.
2 Heraclitus
Heraclitus’ fragment DK 22 B 45 is constructed around journey metaphors:
ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροι ὁ πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν
λόγον ἔχει.
The one who travels over every road will not ﬁnd out, by going, the limits of
the soul. So deep a logos does it/he have.3
3 The fragment is quoted by Diog. Laert. 9.7 as part
of a brief and general introduction to the doctrines
of Heraclitus. The text of the fragment, in the ver-
sion reported above, follows the new edition of Laks
and Most 2016, vol. 3, 188. See also Mouraviev 2006,
III.b/1, 115. However, its translation and interpre-
tation mainly follow Betegh 2009, 398–404. Nev-
ertheless, I am not entirely convinced by Betegh’s
proposal to exclude ἰών from the text (following
Tiziano Dorandi, the most recent editor of Diogenes
Laertius). The wording πείρατα ἰών is the result of
an emendation by Diels of the text transmitted by
the manuscripts. Speciﬁcally, the most important
manuscripts, B and P, present πειρατέ ον (but in
B έ is erased), whereas other manuscripts have πει-
ρᾶται ὃν. The correction πείρατα (scil. ψυχῆς) is a
good solution on the basis of the Latin translation
of the Heraclitean fragment by Tertullian (termi-
nos animae). The participle ἰών, in this position, is
instead more problematic (see von Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff 1927, 276: “so gestellt ist ἰὼν un-
denkbar”). According to Betegh, since “the partici-
ple is not attested in the manuscripts, it does not
have the support of Tertullian, and does not seem
to add much to the meaning, and its syntactical po-
sition may be problematic”, the better option is to
expunge it from the text. To this I would object that:
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Explicit references to the domain of journey are represented by terms such as ἰών, ὁ
… ἐπιπορευόμενος and ὁδόν. That they are metaphoric instantiations is suggested by
the fact that they are used to conceptualize the abstract notions of soul and logos.4 Terms
such as πείρατα and ἂν ἐξεύροι could also be seen as metaphoric instantiations from the
same domain. However, we cannot elucidate Heraclitus’ metaphors in all their nuances
without ﬁrst having a general interpretation of the fragment. This is particularly compli-
cated by the fact that the fragment has been transmitted without contextual information
and, for this reason, it offers more than one univocal interpretation.
As G. Betegh has shown,5 the Heraclitean sentence is composed of four syntac-
tic/semantic units: (a) the soul’s limits, which (b) will not be found out; (c) the traveler;
and ﬁnally (d) the depth of the logos that the soul or, according to Betegh’s interpre-
tation, the traveler has. A ﬁrst problem is to identify which soul Heraclitus is talking
about. Two interpretations have been offered, according to which the soul is either (1)
the divine cosmic soul,6 or (2) the individual soul.7 According to the second reading,
moreover, the individual soul could be further speciﬁed as (2a) the speciﬁc soul of each
(human) individual; or (2b) the particular individual soul of the traveler.8
According to (1), the limits of the soul, indicating the internal extremities of the
space of the soul, characterize the soul as something that has spatial extension, present-
ing it in the same way as one of the cosmic masses. In fact, the expression ψυχῆς πείρατα
recalls the Homeric formulas such as πείρατα γαίης (e.g. Il. 8.478–479; Od. 4.563; Hes.
Erga 168), πείρατα Ὠκεανοῖο (e.g. Od. 11.12), or πείρατα πόντοιο (e.g. Il. 8.478–479).
The Homeric parallels could reinforce the idea of the soul as a cosmic mass like the
masses of earth and ocean.9 In this reading ψυχή coincides with the world soul. Conse-
quently, the limits of the world soul are to be taken as concrete points in space, probably
(1) the epic poetry offers examples of the interjected
participle ἰών, for instance at Il. 1.138 (referred by
Betegh 2009, 397); and above all (2) Pindar Pyth. 10.
29–30, namely the text that animates Diels’ emen-
dation, constitutes a relatively strong parallel and
helps explain the corruption in the transmitted text
at the lowest cost.
4 The deﬁnition of the Heraclitean notion of logos
is a notorious problem, which in a footnote I can
only try to explain in very general terms. Evidence
from ancient texts indicates that, at the beginning
of the ﬁfth century BCE, the term logos described an
oral or written report usually presented to persuade,
please, or teach the public. Yet some pivotal Hera-
clitean fragments, especially B 1, 2, and 50, suggest
that the term can also indicate something that exists
independently from the ‘reporter’. This challenges
the traditional meaning of the word. For a detailed
yet schematic survey of the term logos in sixth and
ﬁfth-century Greek literature, see Guthrie 1965, I,
420–424. More recently, Gianvittorio 2010 advocates
the opinion that Heraclitus’ logos must be translated
as ‘discourse’ or ‘report’ in all its occurrences. The
interpretation of the concept of logos touches on an
aspect of Heraclitus’ thought that, despite its pivotal
nature for the understanding of his philosophy in
general, is rather marginal to the comprehension
of his metaphor use. For this reason, in the present
study, I will leave the term untranslated.
5 Betegh 2009, 405.
6 Kahn 1979; Bollack and Wissmann 1972, 163–164.
7 Marcovich 1967, 367; Dilcher 1995; Pradeau 2002.
8 Betegh 2009, 412.
9 See Betegh 2009, 406. For a parallel, cf. B 36, which
treats the soul on a par with the cosmic masses wa-
ter and earth.
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along the vertical direction.10 According to Heraclitus, no matter how many roads (con-
crete) travellers travel, they won’t be able to discover the (concrete) limits or borders of
the world soul, since its logos is incredibly deep.
According to this reading, we can consider Heraclitus’ use of journey metaphors
as ‘undeliberate’.11 Spatial metaphors are, in fact, employed to conceptualize an abstract
notion, that of the world soul, in terms of a spatially extended mass, similar to the exten-
sion of the ocean, the terrestrial crust, and the size of the sky. We could hardly concep-
tualize and speak about the highly abstract concept of the (world) soul without the use
of metaphors.12 Moreover, as the concept of soul has to be speciﬁed in terms of a spa-
tially extended cosmic mass, the metaphors to be used are most likely spatial metaphors
like those employed by Heraclitus.13 Accordingly, Heraclitus’ metaphor use in this case
would be undeliberate, as there is no sign of an intentional use of spatial metaphors
as metaphors, and, consequently, it does not display any particular communicative pur-
pose. Simply, Heraclitus is using metaphors because they are essential tools in order to
conceptualize and speak of the abstract concepts of the world soul.
According to (2), on the other hand, the sense of the ﬁrst part of Heraclitus’ sentence
will be, in very general terms, that much traveling on the part of the subject does not
help discover the nature of the human soul. According to this reading, the reference
to the limits of the soul needs to be explored further. In fact, if we are not referring
to a spatially extended cosmic soul, what does it mean to say that the human soul has
limits? R. B. Onians believes that πείρατα here means ‘bonds’ (rope-ends), implying
both ‘beginning’ and ‘end’. Taken in this way, the expression ‘bonds of the soul’ may not
indicate an actual place in the body where the soul has its end and beginning,14 but a
metaphorical place. Accordingly, the end and beginning of the soul could indicate its
origin and conclusion, hence the whole parabola of its existence; that is, its fate in this
life and, possibly, beyond. In this framework, another Homeric parallel indicates that
the word πείρατα can signify the end of a certain situation or state of things, signaling
the completion or ﬁnal destination of a process. The word ‘limits’, accordingly, indicates
10 Betegh 2009, 407.
11 On deliberate metaphor use and its communicative
function see Steen 2008 and, more recently, Steen
2017.
12 See the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (or CMT) by
Lakoff and Johnson 1980. In their view, metaphor is
not simply a device of creative literary imagination;
rather, it is a valuable cognitive tool without which
neither poets nor ‘ordinary’ people could concep-
tualize and express abstract concepts such as time,
love, life, death, etc., as well as, in this case, the cos-
mic soul.
13 Similar observations can be made with reference
to the highly abstract concept of time, see Kövecses
2002, 23: “time is a notoriously difficult concept to
understand. The major metaphor for the compre-
hension of time is one according to which time is
an object that moves. Many common everyday ex-
pressions demonstrate this: ‘the time will come when
…’; ‘Christmas is coming up soon’; ‘time ﬂies’; ‘in the
following week …’; ‘time goes by quickly’” (author’s
italics).
14 This is the interpretation by Marcovich 1967, 367.
51
chiara ferella
the idea of end, completion, or even achievement.15 Thus, no one could ﬁnd out the
completion of the human soul, its origin and end – hence, its real nature – by traveling
over every road. The verb ἐξευρίσκω, expressing the idea of discovering, occurs in other
Heraclitean fragments. In B 94, discovery is the result of attentive observation, better
still, of control: the Furies, ministers of Justice, “will ﬁnd it out” if the sun oversteps his
measures. Additionally, B 18 claims that “he who does not expect the unexpected will
not discover it”. It is worth noting that in B 27, “the unexpected” is the fate of men after
death.16 This parallel, together with the word πείρατα in the sense I indicated above,
suggests that the one who travels over every road cannot discern the fate of the human
soul. Furthermore, a comparable form of the verb ἐξευρίσκω occurs in B 22:
χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον.
Seekers of gold dig up much earth and ﬁnd little.
The fragment refers to the seeking of something that is highly precious, in this case
gold, which lies deep inside the earth’s surface and which can only be found, therefore,
through hard effort. In fact, the discovery of a small amount of gold requires that the
seeker digs up much earth. The parallel between εὑρίσκω in B 22 and ἐξευρίσκω in B 45
suggests the idea that looking for the fate of the soul, for its beginning and end, is like
seeking for gold. Accordingly, in order to ﬁnd out the limits of the soul, one has to go
deep down below the surface of things, searching inside oneself,17 looking for hidden
meanings while digging up many irrelevant elements, because the logos lies, like gold,
at a great depth.
Thus, following reading (2), we understand the fragment as Heraclitus denying that
traveling over every road could lead to discovering the nature and fate of the soul. This
has mainly been explained in two different ways: either (I) Heraclitus is pointing out an
unsuccessful method of research coinciding with traveling over many places. In this case,
the ‘limits’ of the soul may potentially be found out if one pursues the right research,
which does not include much traveling; or (II) Heraclitus is paradoxically indicating that
“only the one who travels every road will not ﬁnd out the limits of the soul”.18 In this
case the pivotal content of the fragment is that the soul is limitless. Therefore, searching
everywhere for the limits of the soul will result in the fundamental awareness that what
we are looking for cannot be discovered; for the soul is limitless and this is the truth that
only the one who travels every road can ﬁnd. Reading (II), advocated by Betegh, requires
that, in the last phrase of Heraclitus’ fragment, οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει, the deep logos is
not that of the human soul in general, but that of the particular soul of the traveler: “so
15 Cf. e.g. Od. 23.248.
16 Cf. Kahn 1979, 129.
17 Cf. DK 22 B 101: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν.
18 See Betegh 2009, 412.
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deep a logos does he [i.e. the traveler] have”. According to this reading, traveling is taken
as a “precondition of having [a soul that has] a deep logos”. Betegh’s argument works
as follows: in as much as you travel over every road, your logos increases and gradually
becomes deeper and deeper. That your logos increases means that the logos of your soul
becomes deeper and deeper; yet, as much as your soul has a deep logos, its limits cannot
be found out. “This is why one will never ﬁnd the limits of the soul – only such a person
will be aware of the limitlessness of the soul,” Betegh concludes.19
However, there is at least another possible reading for Heraclitus’ fragment. One
can interpret it in reference to the individual traveler and still make a point in favor
of reading (I), which seems to be more in line with other Heraclitean fragments. This
interpretation takes the sentence οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει, “so deep a logos does he [i.e.
the traveler] have”, as ironic: the one who travels over every road in order to inquire into
the nature and fate of his soul displays de facto a superﬁcial logos. In fact, it is not unlikely
that we see in this fragment a hint at a method of research that Heraclitus seems to
have disliked elsewhere: that kind of inquiry that Heraclitus attributed, for instance, to
Hecataeus and Xenophanes (cf. B 40), and which was also pursued by Herodotus. This
approach to knowledge consists in traveling all around the known world in order to
collect as much information as possible. Yet, this accumulation of factual data is, for
Heraclitus, a form of polymathie, “much learning” that “does not teach understanding”
(B 40). In particular, this way of inquiry is not appropriate to speciﬁc kinds of topics, like
the logos or the nature and fate of the soul. In those cases, Heraclitus seems to recommend
introspection or, at least, an in-depth analysis of the object of research.
Note that it is according to this last reading that Heraclitus’ metaphor use displays
all its communicative power. Through the images of travelers and the many roads over
which they travel, Heraclitus may at ﬁrst have referred, in a less ﬁgurative way, to jour-
neys of knowledge or journeys of discovery – a common practice of early thinkers at
Heraclitus’ time. Nevertheless, the notion of journeys of discovery hinted at by Heracli-
tus can be taken as a metaphor indicating a precise method of research, which, if you
are seeking into the limits of the soul, brings about no relevant results. For the soul can
be penetrated and discovered only through an in-depth analysis that looks for deep, sig-
niﬁcant truth. In this reading, Heraclitus employs journey metaphors to depict the one
who wishes to know in terms of a traveler, while the ‘roads’ traveled could depict the
different methods of inquiry one pursues. Accordingly, knowledge acquired at the end
of the learning process is depicted as the destination of a journey or, more precisely,
as a discovery resulting from research journeys. Note that, as we have seen above, this
idea of a completion achieved at the end of a process is within the Greek concept of
πείρατα (this also being taken metaphorically). Ψυχῆς πείρατα, therefore, turn out to
19 Betegh 2009, 412.
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be the fragment’s most important words; indeed, the core of the message, outlined by
their very ﬁrst position in the sentence.
3 Parmenides
Parmenides20 of Elea analogously used journey metaphors in his philosophy to talk
about topics and methods of inquiry in terms of roads, to refer to those who wish to
know as travelers, and to hint at the results of inquiry in terms of destinations. Much
more than in Heraclitus, however, in Parmenides journey metaphors and, in particular,
the ﬁgurative motif connected to path constitute the central and unifying motif of his
philosophical poem as a whole.21 In fact, Parmenides’ concepts concerning path, jour-
ney, and destination are part of a whole metaphorical scenario: Parmenides (and, in his
example, anyone who wishes to know) is a traveler on a journey with his inquiry-goals
seen as destinations to be reached. His philosophy could be seen as the vehicle that en-
ables people to pursue those goals. The journey is not easy. First of all, there are different
paths one can choose. These paths represent different ways of inquiry; hence, different
methods of inquiry and diverse arguments resulting from them. There are crossroads
where a decision must have been made about which roads and directions one must fol-
low.
To appreciate the centrality of journey metaphors in Parmenides’ philosophy, let us
consider Parmenides’ own words in DK 28 B 2 more closely:
εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας,
αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι·
ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος, ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ,
ἡ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι,
τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν·
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐόν οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν
οὔτε φράσαις.
Come now, I shall tell – and convey home the tale once you have heard –
just which ways of enquiry alone there are for understanding:
the one, that (it) is and that (it) is not not to be,
20 The present analysis of Parmenides’ journey
metaphors is an abridged version of my previous
contribution on the cognitive aspect of Parmenides’
two ways of inquiry: see Ferella 2017, to which I also
refer for a more extensive analysis of the fragments
quoted in this chapter.
21 Cf. Reale and Ruggiu 2003, 28, 177–182.
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is the path of conviction, for it goes with true reality,
but the other, that (it) is not and that (it) must not be
this, I tell you, is a trail wholly without report
for neither could you apprehend what is not, for it is not to be accomplished,
nor could you indicate it.22
In the verses above, words relating to the same metaphor cluster are repeated four times
within eight lines: we haveways, ὁδοί, at l.2, path, κέλευθος, and goes with, ὀπηδεῖ, at l.4, as
well as trail, ἀταρπόν, at l.6. As we can see, not only does Parmenides compare methods
of inquiry to paths, but conviction about certain topics and ways of arguing about them
is said to go together with true arguments, suggesting that developing convincing and true
arguments might be understood as following paths. Elsewhere23 I already demonstrated
that this clustering of metaphors from the same domain is to be taken as a device activat-
ing metaphoricity. This means that Parmenides is here intentionally drawing attention
to the journey metaphors for speciﬁc communicative purposes.24
The suggestion that we deal here with textual devices drawing attention to the
metaphorical domain of journey gains force if we consider the fact that, in the origi-
nal layout of Parmenides’ poem, the verses of B 2 were closely followed by the verses of
B 6:
χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,
μηδὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν· τά σ’ ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.
πρώτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <ἄρξω>,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ’ ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν
πλάζονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φορεῦνται
κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα,
οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τωὐτὸν νενόμισται
κοὐ τωὐτόν· πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.25
It is necessary to say and think that what is is; for it is to be,
but nothing is not. These things I bid you ponder.
For <I shall begin> for you from this ﬁrst way of inquiry,
then yet again from that which mortals who know nothing
wander two-headed: for haplessness in their
22 Text and translation according to Palmer 2009, 364
and 365, slightly modiﬁed.
23 Ferella 2017.
24 On attention to metaphors as metaphors, commu-
nicative purposes, and deliberate metaphor use, see
n. 11 above.
25 The text and translation of this fragment (except




breasts directs their wandering mind. They are borne along
deaf and blind at once, bedazzled, undiscriminating hordes,
who have supposed that it is and is not the same
and not the same; but the path of all these turns back on itself.
Here there are seven words relating to the metaphor cluster of journey within nine
verses. Besides the familiar mapping between ways or methods of inquiry and paths
(see ὁδοῦ at l.3 and κέλευθος at l.9), Parmenides verbalizes the conceptually related idea
according to which the one who wishes to inquire is understood as a traveler. In these
verses in particular, the focus is on human beings who, since they know nothing, βρο-
τοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν, at l.5 are said to wander around, πλάζονται. Yet it is helplessness that
directs, ἰθύνει, their wandering mind, πλακτὸν νόον. Thus, men are borne, φορεῦνται,
along a path that leads to no destination, as it turns back on itself, παλίντροπός ἐστι
κέλευθος.
Let us, furthermore, extend our analysis to B 7 and B 8.1–2, which might have closely
followed B 6 in the original poem:
(7) οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα·
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα
μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα
(8) μοῦνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν[.]
(7) For this may never be made manageable, that things that are not are.
But you from this way of enquiry restrain your understanding,
and do not let habit born of much experience force you along this way,
to employ aimless sight and echoing hearing
and tongue. But judge by reason the strife-ﬁlled critique
I have delivered.
(8) And yet a single tale of a way
remains. …26
The repetition of the same metaphor word in this fragment is noteworthy: the term ὁδός
(in different cases) is repeated thrice within seven verses. Here, as in all occurrences we
26 Text and translation according to Palmer 2009, 366–
369.
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have analyzed thus far, the word ὁδός is used metaphorically to indicate methods or
topics of inquiry. Yet it is worth noting that the ﬁrst reference to ὁδός by Parmenides is
not in the metaphorical sense of ‘ways of inquiry’ as we ﬁnd for the ﬁrst time in B 2.2.
Rather, ὁδός is one of the ﬁrst words of Parmenides’ poem as a whole, and we ﬁnd it
twice within the very ﬁrst ﬁve lines of the prologue to his philosophical poem (B 1.1–5).
Here, ὁδός does not indicate a method of inquiry, but a non-metaphorical27 pathway
that Parmenides travels:
ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,
πέμπον, ἐπεί μ’ ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι
δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ †πάντ’ ἄτη† φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·
τῆι φερόμην· τῆι γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι
ἅρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ’ ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.
The mares who carry me as far as the soul could reach
were leading the way, once they stepped guiding me upon the path of many
songs28
of the divinity, which carries over †all cities† the man who knows.
On it was I borne, for on it were the headstrong mares carrying me,
drawing the chariot along, and maidens were leading the way.29
27 Parmenides’ account of his extraordinary journey
in the opening of his poem is presented as an alle-
gory. Crisp 2005, 117, deﬁnes allegory as a “superex-
tended metaphor”, namely a metaphor “extended to
the point where all direct target reference is elim-
inated”. See, moreover, at p. 129: “Allegories can
be regarded as superextended metaphors. The re-
sult of their ‘superextension,’ however, is to remove
all language relating directly to metaphorical tar-
get. What remains is language that refers to and de-
scribes the metaphorical source, both literally and
non-literally”. We can refer to Parmenides’ proemial
journey as an allegory in the sense Crisp points out:
“Allegory in literary contexts refers to ﬁction that
are given a continuously metaphorical interpreta-
tion [...] What all allegories [...] have in common is
that they never refer directly to their metaphorical
target. Direct reference is only to the metaphorical
source constructed as a ﬁctional situation” (Crisp
2005, 115–116). At pp. 127–128, Crisp clariﬁes this
conclusion: “There is no longer any of that mixing
or ‘blending’ of source- and target-related language
that is the linguistic basis for conceptual blending
[as for instance in an extended metaphor]. The lan-
guage of allegory simply refers to and describes the
metaphorical source. It thus consists of a set of pos-
sible references and predications, or, to speak less
literally, the source is construed as a possible, ﬁc-
tional, situation.” Accordingly, we can say that Par-
menides, in his introductory depiction of his ex-
traordinary journey, employs non-metaphorically-
used, but literally-used language. “A distinction be-
tween metaphorically-used and literally-used lan-
guage can only be drawn in relation to a possible
situation. Language relating directly to that situ-
ation is literal; language relating to it indirectly is
not” (Crisp 2005, 128).
28 Palmer translates “far-fabled”, following Diels-Kranz
(“vielberühmt”), Guthrie 1965, II, 7 and Kirk,
Raven, and Schoﬁeld 1983, 243, but see Mourelatos
2008, 41 n. 93, and Cerri 1999, 167.
29 Text and translation according to Palmer 2009, 362
and 363, slightly modiﬁed.
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It is not unlikely that Parmenides’ audience, when hearing for the ﬁrst time of the two
metaphorical paths of inquiry (B 2.2; see above), were immediately led to link them to
the ὁδός of many songs they heard in the prologue (B 1.2–3). This hypothesis gains force
if we consider the fact that the lines of B 6 appear to be constructed in parallel with the
lines of the prologue. In particular, the description of ordinary people in B 6 plays on the
contrast with Parmenides’ self-representation in the very beginning of his poem. As we
have seen above, in B 6 we are told that mortals know nothing (βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν,
B 6.4), while Parmenides is here depicted as a man who knows (εἰδότα φῶτα, B 1.3).
Moreover, mortals wander along (πλάζονται, B 6.5), and have a wandering understand-
ing (πλακτὸν νόον, B 6.6), because they are borne along (φορεῦνται, B 6.5). In contrast,
mares carry (φέρουσιν, B 1.1) Parmenides along a divine path that leads (φέρει, B 1.3) to
a precise, divine destination that coincides with the source of Parmenides’ knowledge
and philosophy, as we apprehend a few verses later. In contrast, the path of mortals
turns back on itself (παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος, B 6.9), and as such, does not lead to
any destination or knowledge. Given this, it seems reasonable to conclude that, when
hearing of the two ways of inquiry in B 2 and of the depiction of wandering people in B
6, Parmenides’ audience has recalled the whole scene of Parmenides’ journey depicted
in the prologue.
It is worth mentioning that Parmenides’ prologue, quoted in its entirety by Sextus
Empiricus (Adv. Math. VII, 111 ff. = DK 28 B 1), is the account of Parmenides’ exceptional
journey to the house of Night, in order to meet a goddess who is presented as the source
of Parmenides’ philosophy. In fact, the rest of Parmenides’ philosophical discourse co-
incides with the words the goddess reveals to Parmenides (addressed throughout in the
second person singular) on the occasion of their encounter. As M. M. Sassi (1988) has
convincingly pointed out, the ﬁrst words the goddess reveals to Parmenides confront
him with a metaphorical crossroads, namely, as we saw above, with the choice between
the two paths of inquiry. As Sassi argued, the motif of the crossroads plays an essential
role in several accounts of the soul’s journeys to the afterlife that we ﬁnd in the so-called
golden tablets30 and in some of Plato’s myths (like the myth of Er in the tenth book of
Plato’s Republic, 614b).31
30 The golden tablets are texts found in funerary graves
and tumuli of the ﬁfth and fourth century BCE.
They consist of brief texts in hexameter, engraved
on small pieces of gold, destined to provide post-
mortem instructions for the initiates in the under-
world. Scholars have suggested that the texts en-
graved on the tablets come from a more ancient oral
tradition that employed, like Parmenides’ poem,
Homeric material: cf. Edmonds 2004, 32, and Fer-
rari 2007, 120–121. It is worth noting that there are
remarkable verbatim parallels between the text of
the golden tablet from Hipponion and Parmenides’
poem: see Ferrari 2005, 115–117. A detailed analysis
of the tablets can be read in Pugliese Carratelli 2001;
Bernabé and Jiménez 2008; Graf and Johnston 2013.
31 On the myth of Er, see also the analysis by Oki-Suga
in this volume.
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In fact, accounts of the journeys of the souls to the afterlife follow a recurrent pat-
tern. This includes, among other details, the description of a crossroads between differ-
ent paths, which the soul has to choose and follow. In these journeys of the soul the
crossroads between different paths represent the possibility for the soul to reach salva-
tion, following the right path, or perdition, following the wrong road. The road, in other
words, symbolizes the fate of the soul, which in fact is dramatically determined by which
path it will follow. Scholars of Parmenides have extensively shown that the prologue to
Parmenides’ philosophy is full of reminiscences and echoes of these extraordinary, ex-
tramundane journeys of the soul,32 not without eschatological and initiatory aspects.33
Sassi compellingly points out that the philosophical crossroads between two opposite
and indeed mutually exclusive methods of inquiry is another element in this framework,
even though it is not part of the account of Parmenides’ journey in the prologue, but is
included in his philosophical discourse.
However, in contrast to the eschatological texts, in Parmenides, the crossroads is
a journey metaphor indicating the philosophical choice between two methods of re-
search.34 Yet Parmenides’ insistence on journey metaphors as motifs of his philosophical
argumentation and the echoes, through these metaphors, both to his own extraordinary
journey to knowledge and to the soul’s extramundane journeys to salvation or perdi-
tion render Parmenides’ journey metaphors part of a symbolic (and dramatic) frame-
work. Accordingly, his metaphorical crossroads adopts the symbolic value it has in the
accounts of the soul’s journeys. Parmenides’ journey metaphors serve the purpose of
dramatizing one’s own choice towards the right way of inquiry.35
Thus, Parmenides’ use of journey metaphors intentionally draws attention to a con-
ventional and widely used metaphor cluster, that of the journey depicting aspects of
knowledge. His metaphors have, at the same time, argumentative and paraenetic pur-
poses. On the one hand, the idea of a crossroads between two paths of inquiry that the
philosopher/traveler must follow if he wants to gain knowledge has a strongly philo-
sophical value in Parmenides’ poem, as it is very apt to depict Parmenides’ philosophical
dilemma and the principle of tertium non datur: either it is or it is not. Yet, while the god-
dess urges Parmenides to adopt a speciﬁc method of inquiry, to abandon the antipodal
method, and to follow a speciﬁc theory about the physical world, Parmenides wishes
to present and promote his philosophy by persuading his audience to make the right
choice: the choice for his philosophy. In fact, Parmenides’ ﬁgurative language suggests
32 Cf. Morrison 1955; Feyerabend 1984; Pugliese
Carratelli 1988; Sassi 1988; Battezzato 2005, 90; Fer-
rari 2005, 115–117; Palmer 2009, 58–61.
33 Note that εἰδότα φῶτα (B 1.3) and κοῦρος (B
1.24) have been examined as elements indicating a
mystery-initiatory context, as Diels 1897, 49, already
highlighted. See moreover Burkert 1969, 5 with n.
11 and at 14 with n. 32. More recently, see Ferrari
2007, 103.
34 Sassi 1988, 390–391.
35 See Ferella 2017.
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the idea that, just like an extraordinary traveler (such as the soul), the one who wishes to
know about natural philosophy can make a crucial choice of either the right or wrong
path. At the core of his philosophical arguing, therefore, Parmenides might have felt the
need to emphasize that choosing his philosophy is not just an option among other valu-
able alternatives. Rather, it coincides with the sole possibility to gain true knowledge
against unawareness. Once the ‘travelers’ have made the effort to choose the unusual
but right ‘path’, they will experience an extraordinary ‘journey’ that ‘will lead’ them to
the promised ‘destination’, the root of true wisdom, and rescue them from their original
condition as ‘randomly wandering men’. Parmenides’ use of journey metaphors, in con-
clusion, conveys the symbolic and dramatic notion that knowledge of the truth, that is
Parmenides’ philosophy, is ultimately a matter of life or death.
4 Empedocles
Like Heraclitus and Parmenides, Empedocles draws from the metaphor domain of jour-
ney in order to depict himself as a traveler who, by following a certain path of song,
composes his philosophical poem. I am referring in particular to the lines B 3.3–5 that
run as follows:
καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,
ἄντομαι· ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
πέμπε παρ᾽ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ᾽ εὐήνιον ἅρμα.
And you, virgin Muse, white-armed, much wooed,
I entreat you: send what is right for creatures of a day
to hear, driving the well-reined chariot from Piety.
Clearly Empedocles picks up a famous journey motif relating the image of poetry to
a chariot in which the poet, guided by his Muse, rides while composing his song. The
image of the chariot of poetry is a traditional metaphor. Parmenides’ chariot on which
he is borne to the house of Night can be seen as another instantiation of the same image
and, as such, it is traditionally identiﬁed with the chariot of poetry. In this context, the
Daughters of the Sun, who lead the way for Parmenides, are compared to the Muses
who traditionally lead the chariot of poetry and the poetical composition.36 Empedocles
36 As Fränkel 1951; D’Alessio 1995; Asper 1997, 21–98;
Cerri 1999, esp. 96–98, and Ranzato 2015, 25–28
have shown. In this account note that Parmenides
is borne, on his chariot, along a path that is charac-
terized as ὁδὸν … πολύφημον, “a road … of many
songs” (B 1.2). This word occurs once in Od. 22.
375–376 as an epithet of Phemius, the poet “of
many songs” of Odysseus’ house, and in Pindar Istm.
8.56a–61 in which it characterizes the Muses’ thrēnos
on Achilles’ corpse. This is a further element in Par-
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might have had precisely this traditional image in mind when he encourages his Muse
to drive the chariot (of poetry) from Piety. Through this metaphor he claims for himself
the composition of a pious, sacred (εὐσεβής), and divinely inspired song.
Like in Heraclitus and, above all, in Parmenides, in Empedocles we also ﬁnd the
metaphor of people as travelers in the journey of life and, while traveling/living, they
may acquire more or less valuable knowledge. In fact, whereas ordinary people just wan-
der along and know nothing, those who wish to know shall leave the common path and
change their method of inquiry.
Let us examine Empedocles’ fragment B 2:
στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται·
πολλὰ δὲ δείλ᾽ ἔμπαια, τά τ᾽ ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας·
παῦρον δὲ ζωῆισι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες
ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν,
αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτωι προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος
πάντοσ᾽ ἐλαυνόμενοι· τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον <τίς ἄρ᾿> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν;
οὕτως οὔτ᾽ ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ᾽ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ᾽ ἐπακουστά
οὔτε νόωι περιληπτά. σὺ δ᾽ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ᾽ ἐλιάσθης,
πεύσεαι· οὐ πλεῖόν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν.37
For narrow devices are spread through their limbs,
and many wretched things strike in and dull their meditations.
And having seen [only] a small portion of life in their lifetime,
swift to die, carried up like smoke they ﬂy away
convinced only of that which each has chanced to experience
being driven in all directions. Who then boasts that he has found the whole?
These things are not to be seen or heard by men
or grasped with mind. But you then, since you have turned aside to this place,
shall learn: mortal intelligence certainly rises no higher.38
menides’ proem conveying the traditional image of
the chariot of poetry led along the path of divinely
inspired songs.
37 The text of the fragment follows the reconstruction
by Laks and Most 2016, vol. 5, 386–388.
38 The text of the manuscript tradition is not exempt
from some problems. The most intricate is related
to the last line. In my text I accept the reading trans-
mitted by the manuscripts οὐ πλεῖον γε, considering
the modern emendations unnecessary. Like Calzo-
lari 1984, 76 n. 17, and Bollack 1969, III.2, 10 n. 9,
I set a punctuation mark after πεύσεαι. Deichgrae-
ber 1938, 23 n. 37, already adopted this ‘conserva-
tive’ solution, whereas Diels-Kranz followed here
the nineteenth-century editors who reconstructed
the line as follows: πεύσεαι οὐ πλέον ἠὲ βροτείη
μῆτις ὄρωρεν. Their text emphasizes the antithe-
sis between human means and divine knowledge.
For instance, Kranz’s translation “nicht mehr, als
sterbliche Klugheit sich regt und erhebt” highlights
the idea of a limited human understanding with-
out any differences between ordinary people and
the disciple: Empedocles wanted to communicate
to Pausanias no more than any other human be-
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Sextus Empiricus, who quotes these lines in Adv. Math. 7.122–4, refers them to Empedo-
cles’ disdain for sense organs as means to gain genuine knowledge. Human beings are
depicted as equipped with narrow devices,39 which, in conjunction with many wretched
things dulling their meditations and with a small portion of life,40 restrain human be-
ings from ﬁnding τὸ ὅλον, the whole. Hence people merely know what they chance to
experience and are, for this reason, driven in all directions by their impressions, πάντοσ᾽
ἐλαυνόμενοι. The image of people being driven in all direction by their powerless senses
closely recalls Parmenides’ description of ordinary humans knowing nothing, βροτοὶ
εἰδότες οὐδέν, and wandering along because of helplessness that directs their mind.
Thus, just like Parmenides, Empedocles uses journey metaphors to depict ordinary peo-
ple’s unawareness in contrast to a few chosen people who know or will know.
Furthermore, the image of people being driven by their sensorial impressions points
to a method of inquiry that is not appropriate to ‘the whole’ and genuine truth. For per-
ceptions are narrow means able to grasp only a small portion of reality. In contrast, in a
way that is reminiscent of Parmenides, Empedocles’ disciple is said to have exceptionally
chosen a different path. In contrast to ordinary people wandering about, we have seen
above that Parmenides is borne on a precise pathway, which people do not usually walk
upon. This leads to the divine source of knowledge. Similarly, Empedocles’ disciple has
to part from the common path if he wants to gain true knowledge: σὺ δ᾽ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ᾽
ἐλιάσθης, πεύσεαι. In conclusion, we can see that Empedocles extensively draws from
the conceptual domain of journey in order to metaphorically organize and structure his
idea of inquiry and knowledge more generally.
ing can know. However, as Calzolari has already
pointed out, “l’alterità che il frammento stabilisce
tra i mortali impotenti di fronte alla forza delle cose
e il soggetto che si è appartato, per così dire, fuori
dalla mischia (cfr. v. 8), appare ben più evidente
qualora implichi un’antitesi altrettanto marcata tra
non-conoscenza e conoscenza alla cui acquisizione
sia preliminare (come in Parmenide 1, 9) lo strani-
amento, appunto, dall’orma del volgo.” Following
Calzolari, I maintain that the emphasis on “you”
(l. 8) gives prominence to the unique nature of the
disciple’s experience in contrast to all other people.
At the end of his learning process, Pausanias will be
able to know much more than any other ordinary
human being.
39 The term παλάμη, which originally means “the
palm of the hand” and is used as synecdoche to in-
dicate the “open hand” (in opposition to the ﬁst) –
hence, “hand” in most general terms – is here used
metonymically to indicate sense organs. With regard
to sensation, this term conveys the idea that sense
organs are able to grasp reality, as if sensation were a
form of contact. In fact, as we will see in due course,
Empedocles argues for perception occurring be-
cause of a contact, mediated by effluences, between
the organs and the objects of perception.
40 Human beings are depicted as ὠκύμοροι at l.4. The
epic compound ὠκύμοροι always has in Homer the
meaning of “destined to prompt death” and “bearer
of prompt death”. It denotes extraordinary cases
of heroes who hurl themselves upon the enemy.
Empedocles in contrast employs it as an epithet for
the whole of humanity with a shade of universal
pessimism.
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4.1 A new metaphorical stratum
In doing so, Empedocles follows a well-established tradition. In fact, in the examples
analyzed above, we have seen that Empedocles employs, with minor poetical variations,
already established and even entrenched journey metaphors to depict his poetical com-
position and method of inquiry, hence, more generally, various elements related to the
domain of knowledge (the chariot of poetry, the paths of research, ordinary people wan-
dering along, the inquirer as a traveler, knowledge as the destination of the right road of
inquiry, etc.). As we have seen, these metaphors have already been activated by Heracli-
tus and, above all, Parmenides. In the examples that now follow, on the other hand, we
will observe much more substantial innovations where Empedocles introduces, within
the already established metaphor cluster of journey, a fresh metaphorical stratum. This
relates to the cluster under analysis, but contributes, by eliciting creative thinking and
structuring new insights, to original developments in theoretical arguing.
Let us look at fragment B 3 and, in particular, ll. 9–14:
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγ᾽ ἄθρει πάσηι παλάμηι, πῆι δῆλον ἕκαστον,
μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ᾽ ἀκουήν
ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,
μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσηι πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,
γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ᾽ ἧι δῆλον ἕκαστον.
But now consider with every power how each thing is clear
without holding any seeing as more reliable than what you hear,
nor echoing ear above piercings of the tongue
and do not in any way curb the reliability
of the other limbs by which there is a passage for understanding
but understand each thing in the way in which it shows itself.
In these lines Empedocles urges Pausanias to consider everything “in the way in which it
shows itself”, ἧι δῆλον ἕκαστον, with every sense organ he has at his disposal, πάσηι πα-
λάμηι.41 These verses are Empedocles’ advice to Pausanias to sharpen every sense organ
and to make correct use of each of them when inquiring into the physical world. Correct
use requires, for instance, that Pausanias should not prefer a particular sensation over
the other sense organs. Even though sight was traditionally considered as the sensation
that “reveals many distinctions and most enables us to know”,42 Pausanias shall know
41 See n. 39 above.
42 Cf. Aristotle Metaph. 980a. The same opinion is held
by Heraclitus B 55 and 101a and by the Hippocratic
author of De Arte 13.1.
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each thing in the way in which it shows itself. Each sense organ is in fact a “passage for
understanding”, πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι43 (B 3.12).
My claim is that Empedocles is building his theory of sensation upon the metaphor-
ical meaning of πόρος. The word πόρος, which originally indicated a passage over a river
or a narrow part of the sea (a strait), metaphorically depicts a passage through a perme-
able substance such as the skin.44 In Empedocles’ theory of sensation, πόροι are passages
that connect the sense organs at the periphery of the body to a central organ in the body,
which functions as the controlling organ.45 In the metaphor use of πόρος indicating
body channels carrying perceptions along the body, we see that the established clus-
ter of journey/knowledge welcomes a new metaphorical stratum: the notion of traveling
‘quanta’ of knowledge. In other words, while the established metaphor cluster typically
envisages the perceiving and knowing subject as a traveler, the new metaphorical stra-
tum introduces the notion that (material elements coming from) objects of perception
and knowledge can travel.46 This creative element permits the eliciting of productive
reasoning and gives the cue for a new theory of perception and knowledge acquisition
that, as we shall now see, rests upon journey metaphors.
That Empedocles builds upon the metaphorical value of the word poros in his the-
ory of perception and knowledge acquisition is emphasized by fragment B 133. Here,
43 In Homer, the verb νόησα means “perceive by
the mind”, hence “apprehend”: τὸν δὲ ἰδὼν ἐνό-
ησε, Il.11.599; οὐ ἴδον οὐδ᾽ ἐνόησα, Od.13.318, cf.
Il.10.550, 24.337, etc. By extension, it also means
“think”, “consider”, and “reﬂect”: φρεσὶ ν. ἔνθ᾽ εἴην ἢ
ἔνθα in Il.15.81; μετὰ φρεσὶ σῇσι νόησον Αἰνείαν, ἤ
κέν μιν ἐρύσσεαι ἦ κεν ἐάσῃς in Il. 20.311; οὐδ᾽ ἐνό-
ησε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν ὡς ... Il.15.264; see
von Fritz 1943.
44 In Empedocles a further metaphorical meaning for
the term πόρος is attested indicating a textual pas-
sage in a given work (cf. B 35.1).
45 Empedocles did not give a thorough explanation of
what these πόροι are made of and, above all, what
they contain inside: see Theophr. Sens. 13. More-
over, the metaphorical use of the term poros with
reference to sense organs may not be an Empedo-
clean innovation. Alcmaeon of Croton could have
employed this term before Empedocles in order
to refer to body channels that connect the eyes to
the brain. However, as we do not have Alcmaeon’s
words on his theory of perception, but only reports
of later sources (speciﬁcally Theophrastus and Cal-
cidius), we cannot evaluate his use of the term poros
or his metaphorical language in his theoretical dis-
course. Therefore, Empedocles’ verses remain the
ﬁrst Presocratic ﬁrst-hand source we have to ex-
plore this particular topic. Moreover, even though it
could be hypothesized that, because of Alcmaeon’s
use, πόρος at Empedocles’ time is already on its way
to become a technical term in theories of percep-
tion and knowledge acquisition, we can be pretty
sure that Empedocles still perceives its metaphor-
ical aspect. A strong indication of this is Empe-
docles’ use of the synonymous word ἁμαξιτός for
πόρος in B 133 (see below) – an unusual word in
such a context, which activates the metaphoricity
of the whole image. On the estranging effect of rare
words in metaphor use and their power to activate
metaphoricity in such contexts, see Ferella 2017,
116–117.
46 This idea can be related to the traditional image of
words that move and can be moved. In fact they are
winged (Il. 1.201, 2.7, 4.69 etc.), pass the barrier of
the teeth (Il. 4.350, 14.83, etc.) and can be put into
the listener’s θυμός (Od. 1.361, 21.355. Cf. Hes. Erga
274).
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according to Clemens of Alexandria,47 Empedocles presents the divine (τὸ θεῖον) as an
entity that cannot be known by sensation:
οὐκ ἔστιν πελάσασθαι ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτόν
ἡμετέροις, ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἧιπερ τε μεγίστη
πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁμαξιτὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει.48
It is not possible to approach it with our eyes
or to grasp it with our hands, by which the greatest
road of persuasion penetrates to the mind of men.
For the present study, the phrase ἧιπερ τε μεγίστη/πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἁμαξιτὸς εἰς
φρένα πίπτει is highly relevant: therein Empedocles expresses the idea that knowledge
gained from sense organs such as our eyes or our hands is the most persuasive form of
knowledge. What is important to note is that this idea is expressed through a journey
metaphor presenting eyes and hands, metonymies indicating the respective sense or-
gans, as the beginning of a road that leads persuasion to the mind. The idea of sensory
pores as roads through which sensation and also persuasion can ﬁnd passage, hence a
pathway into the body, suggests the image of traveling objects of perception and knowl-
edge entering the body. In fact, according to Empedocles, some elementary streams of
these objects do travel from them through space and may reach the inside of the body,
where the controlling and knowing organ lies.49
Empedocles’ theories of perception and knowledge acquisition are known to us
thanks to Theophrastus’ systematic treatment of the most important theories concern-
ing perception and knowledge acquisition before Aristotle.50 According to Theophras-
47 Strom. 5.81. 2 (DK 31 B 133). Clemens quotes the
lines together with a fragment of Solon (F 16) and
one of Antisthenes (F 24), within a treatment on
how to obtain πίστις about topics that are beyond
the realm of sense organs and escape, therefore,
perception.
48 The text of the fragment follows the reconstruction
by Laks and Most 2016, vol. 5, 366.
49 Empedocles variously refers to this organ by the
term φρήν (or in the plural φρένες), σπλάγχα and
πραπίδες: φρήν: B 134, 4; 23, 9; 114, 3; 133, 4. φρέ-
νες: B 5; B 17, 14. πραπίδες: B 110, 1; 129, 2 and 4;
132, 1. σπλάγχα: B 4.3. It is debated both which
part of the body they describe exactly, and whether
they are used as synonyms to depict the same organ.
It can be generally maintained that they all refer to
“the part of the thorax that is the physical basis of
thinking”: see Wright 1995, 164.
50 In his De Sensibus, Theophrastus classiﬁes the pro-
cesses and the objects of perceiving, thinking, and
knowing with reference to nine early thinkers,
speciﬁcally, Parmenides (sections 3–4), Empedo-
cles (7–24), Alcmaeon (25–26), Anaxagoras (27–
37), Cleidemus (38), Diogenes of Apollonia (39–
48), Democritus (49–82), and Plato (5–6 and 83–
91). While relatively little space is given to the the-
ories of Parmenides, Alcmaeon, and Cleidemus,
Theophrastus draws more attention to Anaxago-
ras, Diogenes, and Plato and dedicates to each of
them approximately ten sections. However, as we
can see, Theophrastus’ investigation focuses above
all on Empedocles and Democritus, and this is a
sign of the importance that these theories have in
their philosophical system. Theophrastus’ prefer-
ence for Empedocles and Democritus may also be
explained by the fact that these two thinkers argue
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tus, Empedocles argues that perception occurs through an adaptation, ἐναρμόττειν,51
of the perceived things to the pores, πόροι, of each sense organ. The adaptation be-
tween sense organs and objects of perception is mediated through ἀπορροαί, literally
“streams”, which are continuously emanated from compounds.52 These streams get in
touch with sense organs and, if they ﬁt them, they may enter the body. Empedocles does
not provide precise information about the nature of the aporroai. Do they have the same
qualities of the objects that emanate them? It seems fair to assume so;53 otherwise it is
difficult to imagine how the perceptual objects could be recognized.
Another general inference we may make is that effluences emanating from com-
pounds are themselves made of (at least one of) the four elements. Indeed, Empedocles’
ontology seems to require that, like everything else in the physical world, effluences too
are elementary substances. Moreover, words, hence sounds, are regarded as ‘things’ in
the epic poems:
In Homer words are winged (Il. 1.201, 2.7, 4.69 etc.), go past the barrier of the
teeth (Il. 4.350, 14.83, etc.) and are put by the listener into his or her θυμός—
μῦθον πεπνυμένον ἔνθετο θυμῷ (Od. 1.361, 21.355); cf. Hes. Erga 274 […] Such
a physical representation of words and thoughts, found in Homer, continues
through the work of other Presocratics (Heraclitus is an obvious example) to
Plato […], Aristotle […] and the Stoics’ assumption of φοναί as σώματα.54
It follows that, during the contact between material aporroai emanating from the per-
ceptual object and poroi in the body, there is an exchange of substance and transit of
external elements into the body. Sensation, in other words, is a material transfer of ele-
mentary streams from the object to the subject of perception. In B 133 it is speciﬁed that
eyes and hands are limbs by which the road of persuasion leads εἰς φρένα. The transit of
sensory elements, therefore, ends in the mind, which, according to Empedocles, is col-
located in the chest. To sum up, the sense organs function as ‘gates’ in the body that may
be entered by streams of sensory elements. Thus, by listening to Empedocles’ doctrine,
by observing things in the world, by smelling, tasting, or touching them, hence by get-
ting in touch with every perceptual item of the physical world, people receive, through
for physiological and quite mechanistic theories that
aim to explain sensation and knowledge acquisition
in a uniﬁed and complex system. This may have led
Theophrastus to concentrate on them in order to
submit them to his most meticulous criticism. See
Sassi 1978, 5–6.
51 At chapter 15, Theophrastus reveals that the word
αρμόττειν is explicitly used by Empedocles to refer
to processes of recognition of things.
52 Cf. Plutarch Quaest. nat. 916 D (=DK 31 B 89): σκόπει
δὴ, κατ᾿ Ἐμπεδοκλέα “γνούς ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορ-
ροαί, ὅσσ᾽ ἐγένοντο …” οὐ γὰρ ζῴων μόνον οὐδὲ
φυτῶν οὐδὲ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίθων
ἄπεισιν ἐνδελεχῶς πολλὰ ῥεύματα καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ
σιδήρου.
53 Cf. Long 1966, 260.
54 Wright 1995, 259.
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their own sensory pores, streams of elementary substance. Through body channels, this
substance travels inside the body and reaches the mind. Here the substance of sensation
is stored up in order to produce thought and knowledge.
Consider now fragment B 110:
εἰ γάρ κέν σφ’ ἀδινῆισιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας
εὐμενέως καθαρῆισιν ἐποπτεύσηις μελέτηισιν,
ταῦτά τέ σοι μάλα πάντα δι’ αἰῶνος παρέσονται,
ἄλλα τε πόλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶνδ’ ἐκτήσεαι· αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει
ταῦτ’ εἰς ἦθος ἕκαστον, ὅπῃ φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστωι.
εἰ δὲ σύ γ’ ἀλλοίων ἐπορέξεαι, οἷα κατ’ ἄνδρας
μυρία δειλὰ πέλονται ἅ τ’ ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας,
ἦ σ’ ἄφαρ ἐκλείψουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο
σφῶν αὐτῶν ποθέοντα φίλην ἐπὶ γένναν ἱκέσθαι·
πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν.
For if, thrusting them in your crowded praecordia
willingly you will gaze on them with pure meditations
these things will all be with you throughout your life
and many other things will spring from these: these will
increase them, each according to its character, where each has its origin.
But if you will turn to other things, such as
the ten thousand wretched things which are among men and blunt their
meditations,
quickly they will leave you with the passing of time
desiring to get to their own spring:
know that everything has thought and a share of understanding.
What are those things, which under certain circumstances will be with Pausanias through-
out all his life, making other things spring from them and increase them, while, under
other circumstances, they will leave him and get back to their offspring?55 I would argue
for interpreting the neutral plurals as all inputs that Pausanias may gain by sensation,
55 The hypotheses of scholars can be divided into those
interpreting the neuter plurals either as the four
elements or as Empedocles’ teachings or true state-
ments about the world. Diels translated them as
“die Lehren des Meisters”. According to Schwabl
1956 the reference is to “die Grundkräfte der Natur”.
Long 1966 suggested that σφε refers to “my teach-
ings”, or “true statements about the world (con-
ceived in physical terms)”, and αὐτὰ ... ταῦτα to
both external elements, that is, teaching in its physi-
cal term and to the elements within a body. Bollack
1969, 577, argues for a reference to the “puissances
[…] sans doute le six”. Trépanier 2004, 160 identiﬁes
them prima facie with Empedocles’ teachings, but
these, “in as much as they are true, can be conceived




ranging from Empedocles’ words to every single piece of information the disciple has
gained by observing, touching, and testing “each thing as it shows itself”. In other words,
ταῦτα/αὐτά here are likely to correspond to all pieces of aporroai emanated by the sur-
rounding world, including Empedocles’ words. Moreover, since they are able to increase
themselves if pushed ﬁrmly in the organs of thought, ταῦτα/αὐτά might also include all
‘secondary’ notions and concepts one may obtain by reasoning, hence all elements po-
tentially useful to gain and deepen one’s knowledge.
As ll.4–5 refer to some sort of growth (αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει/ταῦτ(α)), a reference that
involves the elements seems to be necessary, unless αὔξει is said metaphorically. As I
shall show hereafter, however, we can make sense of these verses in the best way by
taking αὔξει literally and assuming that Empedocles is talking of a physical growth.
According to Empedocles’ physics, growth is an aggregation of elements, while de-
crease coincides with their separation. Growth and decrease imply, therefore, that the
things subjected to them are material compounds (that is, they are made of elements).
However, ταῦτα also indicates something to which one must direct all one’s concern
and attention. Doing so, ταῦτα will be by you through the rest of your life, while many
other things will spring from ταῦτα and increase them. This rules out the four elements
as referent:56 according to Empedocles’ ontology the elements are the principles of ev-
erything and the only things that really are. It makes no sense to state, therefore, that
other things will spring out in addition to the elements and increase them. It follows, there-
fore, that although ταῦτα/αὐτά are made of elements, the referent here cannot be shifted
to the level of the four eternal principles but must stay at the level of perishable com-
pounds.
As we have seen above, all kinds of aporroai are made of physical matter, hence of at
least one of the four elements. Moreover, in Empedocles’ worldview, thoughts may be
seen as somata of some sort, as they are produced by processing the elementary substances
of the aporroai stored up and “cut up” in the chest.57 Furthermore, the bodily nature of
thoughts may be inferred from B 110.4–5: all inputs coming from the environment can
multiply if one reﬂects on them. Yet they increase not only one another, as argued in the
lines above, but they also make the mind grow, as we read in B 17.14: ἀλλ᾿ ἄγε μύθων
κλῦθι· μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει, “But come! Hear my words; for learning will expand
56 See n. 55 above.
57 Cf. PStrasb. a(ii) 29: ἐκ τῶν ἀψευδῆ κόμισαι δείγ-
ματα μ[ύθων.] Here Empedocles invites Pausanias to
“store up in his mind”, κομίζω φρενί, Empedocles’
words as unerring evidence of the truth, ἀψευδῆ
δείγματα μύθων. This indicates that effluences (in
this particular case those originating from Empe-
docles’ words) can be stored up in one’s φρήν. Else-
where, we read that Empedocles’ words can also be
“cut up”, διατέμνω, in one’s σπλάγχα (γνῶθι δια-
τμηθέντος ἐνὶ σπλάγχνοισι λόγοιο, B 4.4). Clearly
both passages indicate a process of reﬂection or
meditation ﬁnalized to produce new thought and
knowledge.
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your mind”. Here, like in B 110.4–5, it is stressed that the process of knowledge acqui-
sition deriving from Pausanias’ attention to, hence his reﬂection upon, Empedocles’
words favors growth in the body and, precisely, in the mind.58 As mentioned above,
growth is always related to the aggregation of elements. This indicates that thoughts,
concepts, epistemic notions, and, in general, all “mental products” of this sort are com-
pounds of elements and have, as does everything else, a physical basis that is subjected
to aggregation and separation.
Thus, as we can see, what happens to the body during sensation and knowledge ac-
quisition is depicted as a mechanical process resting upon an array of journey metaphors:
streams of elementary substances departing from all physical things move through space
and may enter the gates of sense organs, travel through body channels into the body and
arrive at the central organ in the thorax. Here aporroai are stored up, pushed ﬁrmly into
the mind, gazed upon and assimilated. Since they are made of physical stuff, once assim-
ilated, they produce a growth in the body (speciﬁcally, in the mind). Thought produc-
tion and subsequent mental growth only occur, however, if Pausanias is well disposed
towards the inputs the environment continuously emanates. Otherwise, the sensory sub-
stances of the aporroai will abandon him quickly and return to their spring, hence to the
object that emanated them. Once again, we observe that metaphor journeys are employed
to depict substances of perception and knowledge travel from the object to the person,
and even the other way around, if the one who wishes to know is not well disposed to
receive them.
By way of concluding, the purpose behind metaphor use in these Empedoclean
fragments is highly argumentative: journey metaphors are employed in philosophical,
better still in physiological argumentation in order to theorize processes of perception
and knowledge acquisition. What is worth noting here is that Empedocles, by drawing
from a traditional metaphor cluster, creates a completely new picture. Whereas jour-
ney metaphors are traditionally employed according to a standard pattern that depicts
those who aim to know as travelers, their method of inquiry as a path they follow, and
knowledge as the destination of this journey, the poetic genius of Empedocles uses in-
stantiations from the same metaphor cluster to create an innovative image – elements of
knowledge moving through space, entering the body along body channels, and arriving
at the knowing central organ. In conclusion, Empedocles’ variation of an established
metaphorical pattern and his introduction of a new metaphorical stratum result in a
creative, original, and well-formulated mechanical theory of sensation and knowledge
acquisition. Empedocles’ metaphor use is a clear example, I believe, of how inﬂuential
58 Note that the expression ὅπηι φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστωι
in B 110.5 may indicate blood or, more generally,
φρένες as that organ “where each (mental product
or epistemic input) has its origin”.
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(the variations of) a metaphor cluster may be in the production of philosophical rea-
soning. Furthermore, it unambiguously shows to what extent metaphor use contributes
to the formulation of scientiﬁc theories, which will have an important legacy for later
philosophical speculation.
5 Conclusion
Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles pervasively employ journey metaphors to de-
pict aspects of knowledge, but have very different ways of using them and, accordingly,
diverse purposes when drawing from the same metaphor cluster. Heraclitus employs
them either to conceptualize the abstract notion of the world soul or to depict and re-
ject a common method of inquiry coinciding with journeys of research and collection
of factual data, which are found to be insufficient when seeking into the soul (and its
logos). In Parmenides, journey metaphors are employed to depict diverse methods of in-
quiry but display a highly symbolic and paraenetic purpose: by echoing the destiny of
the soul in the afterlife, Parmenides uses these metaphors to dramatize the choice for his
philosophy, presented as the only path that leads to vivifying truth. Finally, Empedocles
uses the same metaphor cluster both in the ‘standard’ way, to depict poetic composition
and ways of inquiry, and by signiﬁcantly innovating on the traditional pattern for gen-
uinely argumentative purposes: journey metaphors depict the physiological processes of
sensation and knowledge acquisition.
All this points to the powerful, malleable, and even polyvalent nature of the
metaphor cluster of journey/knowledge among different philosophers and even within
the same text (above all in the case of Empedocles). The case studies presented here of-
fered some important glimpses into the relation between metaphor, imagination, and
argumentation, above all when a fresh metaphorical stratum is introduced within an
already established metaphor. In particular, they pretty well show to what extent the
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